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面会交流妨害に対する賠償命令

<子供への面会拒否>元妻の再婚相手にも賠償命令 熊本地裁

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 熊本県内の40代男性が離婚後に別居した長男(12)と会えないのは元妻とその再婚相手が拒んでいるためとして、2人を相手取って慰謝料300万円の損害賠償を求めた訴訟で、熊本地裁(永田雄一裁判官)は、事前の調停で義務づけられた面会の日程調整に関する連絡義務を怠ったとして再婚相手に元妻と連帯して30万円を支払うよう命じた。元妻には70万円の支払いを命じた。離婚後に別居した子供との面会交流拒否を巡り、元配偶者の再婚相手の賠償責任を認めるのは異例。
 判決は昨年12月27日付。判決によると、男性と元妻は2006年2月の離婚調停で、親権がない男性と長男の月2回程度の面会交流に合意して離婚。当初は面会できたが、元妻の再婚後の12年7月ごろ、男性に長男と会わないよう求める連絡が元妻側からあった。
 男性は長男と面会交流できるよう熊本家裁に調停を申し立て、14年1月、再婚相手を連絡調整役として面会交流することで合意。しかし、元妻や再婚相手から連絡が滞り、日程を調整できないまま12年5月~15年10月の約3年5カ月間、男性は長男と面会できなかった。元妻は、自身の体調不良や再婚相手と長男との父子関係の確立のために面会できなかったと主張していた。
 永田裁判官は「被告の主張は面会日程を調整する協議を拒否することを正当化するものではない。長男が7歳から10歳に成長する大切な時期に交流できなかった原告の精神的苦痛は相当大きい」と指摘。元妻は日程を協議する義務を怠り、再婚相手も連絡義務に違反したとして、いずれの賠償責任も認めた。
 原告代理人の板井俊介弁護士は「再婚相手の賠償責任を認めた点で画期的だ。面会交流が父親と子供の双方にとって利益があることを示した判決としても評価できる」と話した。【柿崎誠】
 ◇連絡調整機関を
 棚村政行・早稲田大教授(家族法) 離婚で別居した親子の面会交流で一方の再婚相手が連絡役となるケースが増え、再婚家庭の安定と面会交流の継続を両立させるために特別の配慮が必要になっている。欧米のように面会交流の連絡調整をしたり、交流が不調だった場合にカウンセリングしたりして当事者を支援する専門機関を育成するべきだ。

http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20170123-00000004-mai-soci


2006年2月(子供:1歳頃) 離婚調停成立。
2012年7月(子供:7歳頃)面会滞り。
2014年1月(子供:9歳頃)面会交流調停合意。
2015年10月(子供:10歳頃)面会交流再開?(民事訴訟申立てによる?)
2016年12月(子供:11歳頃)民事訴訟判決。

会えなかったのは12年5月~15年10月の約3年5カ月間か。
こちらはもう5年以上だ。

良い判決だと思うが、損害賠償取れたとしても子供に会えなければ、いったい何の意味がある?

オーストラリアでの子供の親権をめぐる問題

オーストラリアはまともだ。

領事部関係情報

子供の親権をめぐる問題

(未成年の子供の旅券申請)

2012年5月18日
在オーストラリア日本国大使館

近年、国際結婚のカップルが増えており、当館領事窓口にも国際結婚の届出や日豪間のカップルの間に誕生した子供の出生届のため来館される方がたくさんいらっしゃいます。
その一方で、結婚生活で困難に直面したそれぞれ国籍の異なる父または母のいずれかが、豪州の法律を顧みることなくもう一方の親の同意なしに子供を連れ去り、問題になるケースも発生しています。

1.親による子の連れ去りが犯罪となる場合

豪の「1975年家族法(the Family Law Act 1975)」では、両親の離婚後も18歳未満の子供の親権は基本的に父母双方が共同で保有します。裁判所から子供の親権やいずれの親と暮らすのか、子供が 離婚した父母それぞれと過ごす時間の配分或いは子供の父母との連絡等子の養育に関する裁判所命令(Parenting Order)が出ている場合、或いは、裁判所において審理中の場合は、日本人親が豪州人親の書面による同意や裁判所の許可なく子供を国外へ連れ去る行為 は、例え実の親であっても犯罪を構成し、最大3年までの懲役刑となる可能性があります。豪州では親による子の連れ去りを日常会話などでは親による子の誘拐 (parental child abduction)と呼ぶこともありますが、法律上は誘拐罪とは呼ばず「1975年家族法」セクション65Y或いは65Zに対する犯罪と呼ばれていま す。
なお、裁判所命令もなく、また、親権が裁判所において審理中でない場合においては、日本人親が他方の親の了解や同意がなく子を一方的に日本に連れ去る行為 は、直ちに犯罪を構成することにはなりませんが、共同親権が基本の豪州においては、裁判所によって他方の親の親権が取り消されていない限り、監護権を侵害 する行為と見なされ、日本人親や子が豪州に帰国した際などに、他方の親から訴訟を提起され裁判において不利になることが予想されます。
国際結婚した後に生まれた子供を日本に連れて帰る際には、こうした豪州の事情にも注意する必要がありますので、具体的な事案については家族法専門の弁護士に相談されることをお勧めします。

<参考>
国際的な子の奪取の民事上の側面に関する条約ハーグ条約)について
豪州はハーグ条約の締約国です。詳しくは豪連邦政府の以下のウェブサイトをご覧ください。
http://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/Families/InternationalFamilyLaw/

2.未成年の子供の旅券申請

未成年の子供に係る日本国旅券の発給申請については、親権者である両親のいずれか一方の申請書裏面の「法定代理人署名」欄への署名により手続きを行ってお ります。但し、旅券申請に際し、もう一方の親権者から子供の旅券申請に同意しない旨の意思表示が予め在外公館になされている時は、旅券の発給は、通常、当 該申請が両親の合意によるものとなったことが確認されてからとなります。その確認のため、在外公館では、通常、子供の旅券申請について予め不同意の意思表 示を行っていた側の親権者に対し、同人が作成(自署)した「旅券申請同意書」の提出をお願いしております。
また、共同親権が基本である豪州において、父母双方が親権者である場合、一方の親権者が18歳未満の子を他方の親権者の同意や裁判所の許可を得ずに国外に 連れ出す行為が刑罰の対象になる可能性については上記1.に述べたとおりです。実際に、居住していた国への再入国に際し、子を誘拐した犯罪被疑者として逮 捕されたり、国際刑事警察機構ICPO)を通じて国際手配される事案も生じております。
当館では在留邦人の皆様がこのような不利益を被ることを予防する観点から、18歳未満の子の旅券申請の際には、他方の親権者の不同意の意思表示がない場合 であっても、旅券申請に関する親権者双方の同意の有無を口頭にて確認させて頂いておりますので、予めご承知おきください。

http://www.au.emb-japan.go.jp/jp/consulate/child_passport.html


Hendrickson vs. Hendrickson裁判

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson

Annotate this Case
Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, 603 N.W.2d 896

Filed Jan. 3, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2000 ND 1
Diane Hendrickson, Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
Mark Hendrickson, Defendant and Appellee

No. 990123

Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, the Honorable Ronald L. Hilden, Judge.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
Opinion of the Court by Maring, Justice.
Rodney E. Pagel, Pagel Weikum Law Firm, Norwest Bank Bldg., Suite 402, 400 East Broadway, Bismarck, N.D. 58501, for plaintiff and appellant.
William A. Herauf, Reichert & Herauf, P.C., P.O. Box K, Dickinson, N.D. 58602-8305, for defendant and appellee.

Hendrickson v. Hendrickson
No. 990123

Maring, Justice.

[¶1] Diane and Mark Hendrickson's 1995 divorce and subsequent child custody and visitation dispute are the subject of two prior appeals to this court, Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 553 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1996) [Hendrickson I] and Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220 [Hendrickson II]. Following this Court's remand in Hendrickson II, the trial court entered an order denying Diane's motion for change of venue, changing custody from Diane to Mark, denying Diane visitation with the children for a period of one year, and requiring Diane to participate in counseling with a therapist of Mark's choosing. Diane now appeals from this order. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for modification of the order.

I.

[¶2] Diane and Mark Hendrickson married in 1980 and purchased a home in Jamestown. Diane lived in Jamestown with their four children. Mark lived and worked in Dickinson, but lived with Diane and the children on weekends, holidays and vacations. The couple divorced in 1995. Diane received custody of the children and Mark was granted visitation. In the original decree, the trial court found the children were attached to their lives in Jamestown and had developed a warmer and more secure relationship with their mother than with their father, due substantially to the long-distance living arrangement. The trial court noted, "Mark and Diane effectively--even if not deliberately or knowingly--jointly decided in advance the issue of custody through the residential arrangements they voluntarily made." The trial court issued a visitation schedule allowing Mark visitation two weekends per month and at Christmas. We affirmed the child custody award in Hendrickson I, concluding that it was not clearly erroneous in light of the family's circumstances. 553 N.W.2d at 218.

[¶3] On October 1, 1997, Mark filed a motion for change of custody asserting Diane was alienating the children from him. He filed the motion after disputes arose over visitation, which went unresolved despite the trial court's modification of the visitation order. Several months before Mark's motion of October 1, the trial court appointed Karen Mueller as guardian ad litem and directed her to evaluate the Hendrickson family. According to the report Mueller submitted, Diane believed herself completely blameless in the breakdown of her marriage and the ensuing child custody dispute. She considered herself the children's sole caregiver and asserted she was "unaware of any parenting skills Mark might possess." Diane admitted to Mueller that she hung up on Mark when he called and until he gave her $20,000 she would continue to do so. Mueller also reported on several occasions assistance from police officers was required to complete a visitation exchange; at one exchange, Diane's son-in-law verbally attacked Mueller, and at a second, one of the children obstinately dared her to "try to make me go." Mueller explained Mark's relationship with the children had been tenuous from the beginning because of his absence from the family home, and that Diane's alienating behavior was causing additional, harmful estrangement between Mark and the children. In an order dated December 9, 1997, the trial court awarded custody of the children to Stutsman County and ordered the family into therapy.

[¶4] Stutsman County, however, declined to take custody of the Hendrickson children. On February 24, 1998, the trial court issued another order, in which the court stated, "[t]his is the most outrageous case that I have seen since I began law school twenty-five years ago." The court also stated:

by deed and innuendo, Diane rewards the children's rejection of their father making this perhaps the worst case of alienation syndrome in the history of the United States . . . . Her statement on the stand that she has "tried and tried" to encourage visitation is patently ridiculous.

[¶5] The court expressed a desire to send Diane to jail for her failure to comply with court orders, yet was concerned this would harm the children. Rather, the court ordered Mark's child support payments to be placed in escrow. The order also stated Mark should continue to have reasonable visitation, but did not grant Mark custody because the relationship between the children and their father had been so poisoned.

[¶6] We reviewed that order upon Diane's appeal and Mark's cross-appeal in Hendrickson II. 1999 ND 37, 590 N.W.2d 220. We concluded the trial court erroneously ordered the child support to be placed in escrow as a sanction against Diane. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. We noted as an alternative remedy, the court could find her in contempt and impose a jail sentence. Id. at ¶ 12. As to Mark's assertion the trial court should change custody, we explained "evidence of alienation or persistent frustration can be relevant factors" in a trial court's assessment of whether there has been a significant change of circumstances following an initial custody determination. Id. at ¶ 13. We then stated:

we recognize methods other than a change of custody should be used initially to remedy a parent's misbehavior, . . . we also recognize that, after exhausting other remedies, a change in custody may be the only method to correct the damage of a particularly stubborn and defiant custodial parent. If the alternative remedies fail, the district court should consider a change of custody.

Id. at ¶ 13.

[¶7] Just before the Hendrickson II appeal, Mark filed another motion to change custody on April 9, 1998, with a supporting affidavit by the guardian ad litem, Karen Mueller. Following that motion, Diane demanded a change of judge. The case was then reassigned to Judge Allan Schmalenberger. Following our remand, Judge Schmalenberger informed the parties that if Mark's pending motion for change of custody were withdrawn, he could invalidate the demand for change of judge and reassign the case to Judge Hilden to carry out this Court's directions in Hendrickson II. Mark withdrew the motion, and on April 5, 1999, Judge Schmalenberger reassigned the case to Judge Hilden because "he is in the best position to understand the case and to carry out the directions of the North Dakota Supreme Court."

[¶8] On April 26, 1999, Judge Hilden issued an order, first denying Diane's motion for change of venue and then turning to consideration of our remand. In its order, the court found Diane had frustrated visitation between Mark and the children and had attempted to alienate the children from their father. The court concluded there had been a significant change of circumstances following the original child custody determination. The court then stated:

This Court has exhausted remedies available to correct Diane Hendrickson's misbehavior. Diane Hendrickson has proven to be a stubborn and defiant custodial parent and the only option yet available is to change custody. Moreover, I find that it is in the best interest of the children that custody be changed and, therefore, I grant immediate custody of the Hendrickson children to their father, Mark Hendrickson.

In addition, the trial court ordered that Diane have no visitation for one year after the custody transfer and required her to submit to counseling with a counselor chosen by Mark. Diane appeals from this order.

II.

[¶9] Diane asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a change of venue. We disagree. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-04-07(3), a trial court may change the place of trial "[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." A motion for change of venue on grounds of convenience of witnesses and furtherance of the ends of justice is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court. American State Bank of Dickinson v. Hoffelt, 236 N.W.2d 895, 898 (N.D. 1975). The applicant must produce facts affirmatively establishing a change of venue is warranted. Eckman v. Stutsman County, 1999 ND 151, ¶ 6, 598 N.W.2d 494. The trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id. at ¶ 7.

[¶10] Diane asserts this case is similar to Whitehead v. Whitehead, in which we declared the denial of a motion for change of venue would be an abuse of discretion when both parties, their child, and all material witnesses lived outside the county where the action was then venued. 336 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (N.D. 1983). We conclude the procedural posture in the two cases differs substantially. In Whitehead, the motion to change venue preceded determinative evidentiary hearings. Id. at 364. In this case, however, following the remand and reassignment to Judge Hilden, no additional evidentiary hearing was necessary for the trial court to comply with our decision in Hendrickson II. There simply are no witnesses to be inconvenienced by the location of the action. In addition, given the tortuous history of this case and the parties' continued conflict over their children, we believe the ends of justice will be best served by an expeditious resolution of this action. On the facts of this case, we determine continuing the current venue will serve that end. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Diane's motion for change of venue.

III.

[¶11] Diane contends the trial court's decision to change custody was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. We analyze this issue under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, which imposes limitations on post-judgment custody modifications. We conclude the trial court's order was supported by the evidence. We determine, however, the order should be modified to allow Diane supervised visitation.

A.

[¶12] Diane submits the trial court erroneously used a change of child custody as a contempt sanction. Further, Diane asserts Mark's withdrawal of the April 9, 1998, motion for change of custody left no such request pending, so that the trial court was without power to change custody. Diane also contends, even if such a motion was properly before the court, it could not order the change without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Diane misunderstands the trial court's order and the procedural stance of the action following our remand.

[¶13] We first address Diane's contempt argument. The trial court's April 26, 1999, order does not find Diane in contempt. The order contains no indication the trial court used a change of custody as a contempt sanction.

[¶14] Second, the withdrawal of Mark's April 9, 1998, motion for change of custody did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the custody issue on remand from this Court. The appeal in Hendrickson II included a cross-appeal by Mark asserting the court should have granted his motion for change of custody. Our remand encompassed that issue and allowed the trial court to reexamine its decision on child custody. When the case returned to the trial court on remand, the issue was properly before the court.

[¶15] Third, the order appealed from in Hendrickson II was preceded by a full evidentiary hearing and submission of a guardian ad litem's report. Our decision in Hendrickson II clearly contemplated custody might be changed upon remand. 1999 ND 37, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 220. On this record, no additional evidentiary hearing was required under the statute. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(4).

B.

[¶16] Diane next argues the change of custody to Mark was clearly erroneous because it was unsupported by the evidence. We disagree. When a trial court entertains a motion to change custody of children of divorced spouses, the judge must determine two issues: whether or not there has been a significant change in circumstances since the original divorce decree and custody award and, if so, whether or not those changed circumstances compel or require a change in custody to foster the best interests of the child. Mosbrucker v. Mosbrucker, 1997 ND 72, ¶ 6, 562 N.W.2d 390. See also N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(6); Holtz v. Holtz, 1999 ND 105, ¶ 10, 595 N.W.2d 1 (statutory standard "essentially tracks the two-step approach previously used by this Court for deciding a change of custody case"). The party seeking modification bears the burden of showing a change of custody is required. Mosbrucker, at ¶ 6. A trial court's decision to modify custody is a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at ¶ 5. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if it is clear to the reviewing court that a mistake has been made. Id.

[¶17] In the order of April 26, 1999, the trial court expressly concluded both elements required for a change of custody existed: the circumstances significantly changed after the original child custody award and the changed circumstances required a change in custody in the best interests of the children. Supporting these conclusions were the trial court's findings that Diane frustrated both the original and subsequent visitation orders and attempted to alienate the children from their father. Specifically, the court noted Diane's removal of the children from the home at scheduled visitation times, her refusal to allow Mark to take the children for visitation, and her refusal to make visitation arrangements. Testimony from the record supports these findings, as does the guardian ad litem's report, which states Diane's alienating behavior was "indicative of an unhealthy parental figure." Further, the court noted Diane had numerous opportunities to change her behavior and failed to do so.

[¶18] In Blotske v. Leidholm, we stated "frustration of visitation does not alone constitute a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody," and a court should first resort to a more rigid visitation schedule, rather than change custody. 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992). However, we also explained visitation problems may justify a change in custody when a court finds such problems have worked against a child's best interests. Id. In addition, in Hendrickson II, we stated that, though other methods should be used initially to remedy misbehavior by a parent, "after exhausting other remedies, a change in custody may be the only method to correct the damage of a particularly stubborn and defiant custodial parent." 1999 ND 37, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 220. Finally, we note the Legislature has expressly recognized frustration of visitation may require a change of custody. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5), a trial court may not change custody within two years after the date of entry of a custody order. This time limit does not apply, however, if the trial court finds both that a modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child and also that there has been a "persistent and willful denial or interference with visitation." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5)(a). The next subsection allows the trial court to modify custody before the two year period expires upon a finding that a change is necessary for the child's best interest and that the child's environment "may endanger the child's physical or emotional health or impair the child's emotional development." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6(5)(b). Thus the legislature considers persistent frustration of visitation and the emotional and physical endangerment of children to be in the same behavioral class and accords the same remedy.

[¶19] While the trial court did not expressly find Diane's persistent frustration of visitation worked against the best interests of her children, we can discern the rationale for the court's conclusion from inference and deduction, so we need not remand for the court to clarify its finding. Holtz, 1999 ND 105, ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d 1. The trial court's findings make it clear the children were deprived of contact with their father by Diane's withholding visitation rights. The right of the children to visitation is presumed to be in their best interests. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610. Thus withholding contact with a loving parent works against the best interests of the children. The record enables us to clearly understand the trial court's basis for its conclusion of law. We conclude the trial court's decision to change custody to Mark after trying other remedies was not clearly erroneous.

[¶20] In her reply brief, Diane asserts the trial court erred because it did not allow her to cross-examine the guardian ad litem regarding her report. We do not address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief because, under Rule 28(c), N.D.R.App.P., a reply brief must be confined to new matter raised in the appellee's brief.(1) Freidt v. Moseanko, 484 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 1992).

C.

[¶21] Though we conclude the change of custody was proper and we sympathize with the trial court's frustration, we do not believe Diane should be deprived of all visitation for one year. We have stated visitation between a non-custodial parent and a child is presumed to be in the child's best interests and that it is not merely a privilege of the non-custodial parent, but a right of the child. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610. Thus, a court should only withhold visitation when it is "likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health." Id. We explained this to the Hendricksons in Hendrickson II, speaking to the need for visitation between Mark and the children. 1999 ND 37, ¶ 7, 590 N.W.2d 220. We are no less committed to those principles now that the tables have turned. Denying a non-custodial parent visitation with a child is "an onerous restriction," such that "physical or emotional harm resulting from the visitation must be demonstrated in detail" before it is imposed. Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993). We believe continuing, supervised contact with Diane should be attempted before she is denied all visitation. At oral argument, Mark agreed supervised visitation would be an acceptable outcome. We, therefore, reverse that part of the trial court's order denying Diane visitation for one year and remand for modification to allow supervised visitation.

IV.

[¶22] Diane next asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to see a counselor of Mark's choosing. A trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. Krizan v. Krizan, 1998 ND 186, ¶ 13, 585 N.W.2d 576. We conclude the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion, because it left the choice of the counselor up to Mark.

[¶23] In Johnson, we reviewed a trial court order requiring the parties' children to receive counseling to deal with problems arising from visitation. 502 N.W.2d at 835-36. There, the trial judge considered psychological treatment necessary for the children's welfare. Id. at 836. By approving of this order, we confirmed the trial court's authority to order a child to receive counseling if it is in a child's best interests. We determine the trial court may order counseling for a child's parent as well if it is in the child's best interests. This is especially important in the context of parental alienation because an alienating parent's unhealthy behavior, left untreated, may continue to impede a child's development of an emotional attachment to the other parent.

[¶24] In this case, we conclude the trial court correctly determined Diane's behavior merited counseling. We also agree Diane's continual defiance of court orders suggests she should not be allowed to choose her own counselor, for fear she will frustrate the court's goals. We do not agree, however, the situation will be best served by allowing Diane's ex-husband to choose her counselor. We, therefore, direct the trial court to obtain from both parties a list of qualified counselors. The trial court should then choose Diane's counselor from among those named.

V.

[¶25] This Court recognizes the difficulty divorced spouses encounter when trying to resolve post-marital disputes regarding their children. We wish to emphasize, however, divorced parents may not use their children as pawns in their battles. Children benefit from healthy relationships with both parents; divorced parents must seek to facilitate such bonds. When a custodial parent deprives a child of the right to have contact with the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent may lose custody. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's order changing custody to Mark and denying Diane's motion for a change of venue. We reverse and remand for a modification of the order to allow Diane supervised visitation and for the trial court to choose Diane's counselor.

[¶26] Mary Muehlen Maring
William A. Neumann
Dale V. Sandstrom
William W. McLees, D.J.
Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

[¶27] William W. McLees, D.J., sitting in place of Kapsner, J., disqualified.Footnote:

1. We recently considered a party's right to cross-examine an investigator in an evidentiary hearing on a motion to change custody. Quarne v. Quarne 1999 ND 188, 601 N.W.2d 256. In Quarne, we held it was reversible error for a trial court, when making a custody decision, to rely on facts in an investigator's report without allowing the party to call and cross-examine the investigator. Id. at ¶ 6. Our refusal to consider the issue for procedural reasons in this case does not undermine our commitment to that holding.

http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2000/990123.html

メモ

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/column/editorial/CK2016122002000116.html
2016年12月20日 子の引き渡し 連れ去りを生まぬよう

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/living/life/CK2016120702000005.html
2016年12月7日<子どもに会いたい 別居後の面会交流>(上) 妻拒絶でかなわぬ望み

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/living/life/CK2016120802000001.html
2016年12月8日<子どもに会いたい 別居後の面会交流>(中) 不安抑えて「娘のため」

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/living/life/CK2016120902000002.html
2016年12月9日<子どもに会いたい 別居後の面会交流>(下) 親の愛情を確認する機会

こういうまともな記事が出るとうれしい。
フェミの精神を蝕むようなデタラメな記事とかホントきつい。あれこそモラハラ
フェミ千田の記事とか一週間は動けなくなるレベルの精神攻撃。

自分が死ねば元妻も子どもも家裁も社会もみんな満足

千田有紀教授らの文章は凶器だ。
DV被害から逃れて子連れ別居・離婚することは知ってるし、そういう場合は適切に保護されるべきだというのにも同意する。でもDVの事実がないのに連れ去られ何年も子どもに会えなくなっている自分のような親もいる。
親子断絶防止法は何年も子どもに会えていない自分にとって一筋の光明なんだけど、それを全否定しガチで頭おかしいとか侮辱されるのは心臓に刃をつきたてられたように辛い。
この人たちには子どもを連れ去られて苦しんでいる親の存在が見えていないんだろうか。

親子断絶防止法成立を訴えている人たちはDV被害者の存在をちゃんと認めてDV被害者に対する配慮をしているのに、親子断絶防止法に反対している人たちは子どもを連れ去られて苦しんでいる親を全てDV加害者扱いして侮蔑し罵倒を浴びせてくる。

元妻に拒絶され、
元妻に洗脳された子どもからも拒絶され、
家庭裁判所にも拒絶され、
社会からも拒絶される。

自分が死ねば、遺産は全て子どものものになって同居親の自由になる。
老いた母は孫にも会えず、遺産の権利もない。
自分が死ねば、母も長くはないと思う。

自分と自分の母が死ねば、子どもの父方親族は消滅する。
元妻も子どもも家裁も社会も、誰一人自分が生きていることを望んでいない。皆、自分が死ねば笑いをこらえながら悔やみの言葉を述べるのだろう。

それともギリギリまで養育費を搾り取って、もう絞り取れなくなってから死んで欲しいと思ってるのかな。

でも、
もう疲れたよ。

メモ

「“子どもの立場”から「親子断絶防止法案」はどう見える?NPO法人ウィーズ・光本歩さんに聞く(1/2)」
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト
12/10(土) 10:31

http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161210-00065334/

「「親子断絶防止法案」の最大の問題点! 本当に「子どものため」なら大人たちがやるべきことは?(2/2)」
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト
12/13(火) 6:30

http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161213-00065339/

「「親子断絶防止法」はどう修正すべきなのか? 弁護士・打越さく良さんに聞く(1)」
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト
11/22(火) 15:00

http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161122-00064709/

「親子断絶防止法の注目ポイント「連れ去り禁止」は行き過ぎ?妥当? 弁護士・打越さく良さんに聞く(2)」
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト
11/24(木) 15:30

http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161124-00064780/

「今の離婚制度では子どもの権利を守れない 「親子断絶防止法」について弁護士・打越さく良さんに聞く(3)」
大塚玲子 | ライター、編集者、ジャーナリスト
11/26(土) 7:00

http://bylines.news.yahoo.co.jp/otsukareiko/20161126-00064786/

面会交流と養育費の司法統計

面会交流 件数 認容・成立件数 認容件数 成立件数 認容・成立率
H13(2001) 2699 1383 70 1313 51.2%
H14(2002) 3184 1703 113 1590 53.5%
H15(2003) 3894 2025 150 1875 52.0%
H16(2004) 4419 2364 196 2168 53.5%
H17(2005) 4719 2604 239 2365 55.2%
H18(2006) 5197 2798 283 2515 53.8%
H19(2007) 5591 3180 316 2864 56.9%
H20(2008) 6020 3475 319 3156 57.7%
H21(2009) 6349 3786 412 3374 59.6%
H22(2010) 7001 4321 432 3889 61.7%
H23(2011) 7965 5133 565 4568 64.4%
H24(2012) 8828 5742 618 5124 65.0%
養育費・扶養料 件数 認容・成立件数 認容件数 成立件数 認容・成立率
H13(2001) 13141 8878 408 8470 67.6%
H14(2002) 14251 9632 486 9146 67.6%
H15(2003) 16953 11745 885 10860 69.3%
H16(2004) 16861 11879 1211 10668 70.5%
H17(2005) 15628 11367 1273 10094 72.7%
H18(2006) 15372 11136 1259 9877 72.4%
H19(2007) 14837 11090 1321 9769 74.7%
H20(2008) 15501 11687 1405 10282 75.4%
H21(2009) 17845 13534 1791 11743 75.8%
H22(2010) 18438 14111 1829 12282 76.5%
H23(2011) 17898 13870 2100 11770 77.5%
H24(2012) 18482 14417 2140 12277 78.0%